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Correct attack type of insinuator cookie bruteforcer
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maennchen committed Dec 12, 2024
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Expand Up @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ In a controlled environment—such as an internal network—this works well. EPM

EPMD itself does not enforce strong authentication. Erlang clustering uses a “cookie” as a shared secret, but this cookie is not intended as a robust security mechanism—it’s more of a sanity check to prevent accidental cross-node connections. If an attacker can guess or brute-force the cookie, they could join your cluster.

Once inside the cluster, the attacker could potentially run arbitrary Erlang Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs), giving them full control of the application and underlying system. While no widespread internet-based attacks on EPMD have been documented publicly, the theoretical risk is real. A known timing-based brute-force approach is described here:
Once inside the cluster, the attacker could potentially run arbitrary Erlang Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs), giving them full control of the application and underlying system. While no widespread internet-based attacks on EPMD have been documented publicly, the theoretical risk is real. A known brute-force approach is described here:
[https://insinuator.net/2017/10/erlang-distribution-rce-and-a-cookie-bruteforcer/](https://insinuator.net/2017/10/erlang-distribution-rce-and-a-cookie-bruteforcer/)

### Scope of the Problem
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